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Abstract
The International Consortium for Prevention and Infection Control (ICPIC) organises a biannual conference (ICPIC)
on various subjects related to infection prevention, treatment and control. During ICPIC 2015, held in Geneva in
June 2015, a full one-day session focused on the 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa. This
article is a non-exhaustive compilation of these discussions. It concentrates on lessons learned and imagining a way
forward for the communities most affected by the epidemic. The reader can access video recordings of all lectures
delivered during this one-day session, as referenced. Topics include the timeline of the international response,
linkages between the dynamics of the epidemic and infection prevention and control, the importance of
community engagement, and updates on virology, diagnosis, treatment and vaccination issues. The paper also
includes discussions from public health, infectious diseases, critical care and infection control experts who cared for
patients with EVD in Africa, in Europe, and in the United Sates and were involved in Ebola preparedness in both
high- and low-resource settings and countries. This review concludes that too little is known about the
pathogenesis and treatment of EVD, therefore basic and applied research in this area are urgently required.
Furthermore, it is clear that epidemic preparedness needs to improve globally, in particular through the
strengthening of health systems at local and national levels. There is a strong need for culturally sensitive
approaches to public health which could be designed and delivered by social scientists and medical professionals
working together. As of December 2015, this epidemic killed more than 11,000 people and infected more than
28,000; it has also generated more than 17,000 survivors and orphans, many of whom face somatic and
psychological complications. The continued treatment and rehabilitation of these people is a public health
priority, which also requires an integration of specific medical and social science approaches, not always
available in West Africa.
The Ebola virus
The emergence of Ebola viruses should be considered
under the dual perspective of a large field of emerging
viruses and considerable complexity and diversity among
Ebola viruses themselves. Between 50 and 60 viruses are
known to infect humans. Around 80 % are shared with
animals. Unexpected viral outbreaks affecting humans
over the past century include Yellow fever, Chikungunya,
Dengue, West Nile Virus, MERS-CoV, Enterovirus 68,
Enterovirus 71, Zikavirus, Japanese encephalitis, Hanta-
virus, Lassa, Marburg, Rift Valley, Crimean-Congo fever,
Nipah and Hendra.
Compared to other viruses, Ebola virus is large and
long – almost visible in an optical microscope – but has
a small genome coding for 7 genes [1]. It is a RNA virus,
meaning that it must continually replicate or die.
Whereas DNA viruses or retroviruses have strategies
such as latency, integration, chronic infection or reacti-
vation, this is not an option for RNA viruses and ex-
plains why they often produce short and acute
infections.
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The Ebola virus genome is a 19 kB single RNA strand
around 1000 nm in length [1]. As with other RNA vi-
ruses, the mutation rate is high: around one error per
10,000 to 100 000 nucleotides, which corresponds to
one mistake per replication on average. Furthermore,
gene exchange and recombination between viruses is
possible. On the whole, the Ebola virus displays a high
diversity, a high mutation rate, and it also probably has a
large animal reservoir. These are three contributing
factors that make epidemics probable.
Species barriers are important factors when consider-
ing viruses. For example, smallpox in humans is related
to mousepox or camelpox, but each can infect only a
single species due to genetic differences that are in the
range of only 1–2 % [2]. In the case of the Ebola virus,
fruit bats are a likely reservoir, but, antilope, rodents,
and perhaps other mammals may also play a role [1].
The virus can also be transmitted to humans from apes,
which are accidental hosts. Overall, the prevalence of
Ebola virus disease (EVD) infections in non-human pri-
mates is not known and more research is clearly needed
in this area.
In the case of the 2014–2015 EVD outbreak in West
Africa, RT-PCR analysis and sequencing have shown
that the pathogen is a Zaire Ebola virus. The variant
involved in this outbreak has been named Makona, by
the name of a river running through the area between
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone where the outbreak
was first declared.
Pending further investigations, the outbreak was prob-
ably a zoonotic event, which was transmitted to humans
via an index case in Guéckédou district, Guinea; [3] then
human to human transmission ensued. Genetic analysis
shows that the Makona variant emerged from a common
ancestor in 2004 [4]. The mutation rate of the Makona
variant is in the expected range [5, 6]. However, it is not
yet known in detail what the similarities and differences
are between the 1976 and 1995 Kikwit variants and the
current Makona variant. Recent research shows that this
variant is constantly evolving but not fundamentally
changing [7]. However, the fact that the virus sequences
were not freely available online constituted a failure of
the global response to this epidemic.
It should be remembered that another EVD outbreak
occurred recently, in Democratic Republic of Congo, in
July 2014 [8]. It affected Boende town in Equateur prov-
ince, where there were 69 cases and 49 deaths, implying
a 74 % fatality rate. Fortunately, the epidemic was rapidly
brought under control. Analyses have shown that the
virus was also a variant of the Zaire Ebolavirus species,
with 96.8 % genetic identity to the current Makona
variant.
Viral load at diagnosis is clearly linked to survival [9–12].
There are indications that the viral load in the present
Makona epidemic may be up to 1000 times higher than in
the Boende/Kikwit epidemic [13]. Moreover, clinical course
in cynomologus macaques infected with the Makona vari-
ant seems to be slightly different compared to what has
previously been observed with other variants; death occurs
later in the course of the disease, and diarrhoea is more
profuse, increasing the spread of infectious body fluids [14].
Furthermore, while no difference has been shown in decay
rates of the Makona variant compared to the historical
Yambuku variant in different matrices, the former seems to
be more resistant during the drying process in human
blood in experimental conditions mimicking the West Afri-
can environment [15]. Those specific viral factors, com-
bined with geographic, economic, social, and cultural
determinants might explain the rapid expansion of the
EVD epidemic in West Africa. Indeed, this outbreak
marked the first reported EVD in this part of Africa; the
lack of preparedness in countries suffering from poor
health infrastructure, the geographic situation at the
border of 3 different countries near major road net-
works enabling important human mobility to major
capital cities, rooted beliefs in traditional medicine,
burial practices, and reluctance to and fear of official
health interventions have all participated to the unprece-
dented spread of the virus [16]. As in many other viral
outbreaks, super spreaders are a significant problem [17].
For example, in 2014, a burial ceremony in Kenema,
Sierra Leone, gave rise to 345 secondary cases [18].
It should be made clear that future outbreaks of EVD
cannot be predicted and that much is still unknown
about the biology and pathogenesis of the virus. For ex-
ample, the receptors on human cell surfaces to which
the Ebola virus attaches are not well known and are a
priority for future research.
Timeline of the response
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hFK-Bzy5c6M
and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrBQM-C9CB8
Between 2000 and 2015, progress in international
collaboration on issues related to infectious threats often
occurred in the wake of epidemics or crises. The creation
of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
(GAVI) and of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network (GOARN) in 2000, the advent of the International
Health Regulations (IHR) in 2005 and the Pandemic
Influenza Framework Preparedness (PIP) in 2011 paved the
way for improvements in the international management of
such threats. Over the same time frame, several serious
local, regional or global outbreaks occurred, including SARS,
H5N1, H1N1, cholera, MERS-CoV, H7N9 and Ebola.
The 2014–2015 EVD epidemic is exceptional in its
magnitude, speed, severity, and international spread over
six countries in West Africa; as well as in Guinea,
Liberia and Sierra Leone, cases were recorded in Nigeria,
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Senegal and Mali [19]. The global response against it is
also without precedent, bridging together many national
and international partners and the first time ever United
Nations emergency health mission: UNMEER (United
Nations mission for Ebola emergency response).
The World Health Organization set up a roadmap
from 28 August 2014 with three main objectives
(Table 1) [20]. Activities to achieve these objectives cov-
ered case management, case diagnosis, surveillance, safe
burials and social mobilisation. To limit the spread of
the epidemic, extraordinary measures were implemented
as provided by the International Health Regulations
(HIR) framework: mass gatherings were deferred and
there were temporary recommendations for limiting
travel.
As of June 2015, the international response coordi-
nated by WHO and its partners involved over 2000
foreign medical staff belonging to 58 medical teams
from 40 organisations, who provided support to 66
Ebola treatment centres (ETC) and more than 800
community hospitals and centres. Over 4000 health care
workers (HCWs) were trained in affected countries and
1.5 million personal protective equipment (PPE) sets
were distributed. Disease detection was enhanced by
the contributions of 900 epidemiologists and 23 WHO
Collaborating Centres belonging to the Emerging and
Dangerous Pathogens Laboratory Network (EDPLN).
Ebola preparedness plans were implemented in 15 coun-
tries: 45 guidance documents were published by WHO
and its partners between March 2014 and June 2015, on
topics ranging from infection prevention to safe burials.
In retrospect, three phases can be observed in this
epidemic. At first, the response was based on available
capacities at local and country levels, then a massive
scaling up occurred with international support. The
third phase relies much more on community engage-
ment, which is essential in at least three areas: service
delivery (early diagnosis, safe care, safe and dignified
burials), planning and implementing services, and ser-
vice uptake (advocacy, education and information, moni-
toring). The priority here is to ensure essential services
and lay the foundation for health sector recovery and
the strengthening of national core capacities.
The bridge between emergency response and health
systems recovery and strengthening is critical because of
the impact that the EVD epidemic has had on health
systems in the three most affected countries. In Liberia,
there was a 23 % decrease in institutional childbirths, a
39 % decrease in children treated for malaria, a 21 % de-
crease in childhood immunisation and as much as a
90 % drop in family planning visits. The recovery and
development of health systems implies short-term cap-
acity building in the health sector as well as a shift towards
a community approach, which is one of the most salient
elements of the WHO roadmap. Assigning a family mem-
ber as the interface between family and health centre has
proven to be an efficacious way of involving families and
the community at large, and constitutes a best practice.
Médecins sans Frontières
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=el0zhxCCgnQ
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) played an essential
role throughout the EVD outbreak and especially in its
initial stages. This organization had experience from
having been active in almost all filovirus outbreaks in
Africa since 1995. From 2011, MSF had also been run-
ning a malaria programme in Guéckédou, Guinea, where
the index case of the 2014–2015 EVD epidemic was
identified. In March 2014, the Ministry of Health of
Guinea transmitted to MSF 15 case descriptions, of
which nine had been fatal. All were from the same fam-
ily group or were staff from the local hospital. The re-
port was transmitted to MSF headquarters in Geneva
where Ebola virus infection was rapidly suspected be-
cause one of the cases was described as having hiccups.
MSF raised the alarm within 48 h and sent further staff
to the field in the following days. The affected popula-
tion was mobile and crossing borders, so the very first
step was to isolate patients. This rapidly evolved into a
six-pillar Ebola management system (Table 2).
On week 25 following the identification of the index
case, MSF declared the epidemic out of control. On
week 33, MSF took over the management of a large ETC
in Foya, Northern Liberia, where two HCWs had been
infected. The progression of the epidemic led MSF to set
up the largest ETC, in Monrovia, with 240 beds.
Altogether, MSF has been running 15 medical centres
and two survivor clinics (in Freetown and Monrovia)
during the epidemic. As of June 2015, some 6500 staff
members have been involved, caring for 8509 patients
among which 5177 were confirmed as EVD cases and
2449 survived (47.3 % survival rate). A total of 28 MSF
staff became infected with Ebola virus (three were expa-
triates from Europe or North America) and 14 (50 %)
survived.
The outbreak response in the two largest cities in the
region, Freetown and Monrovia, was qualitatively and
quantitatively different from work in rural areas: it
Table 1 Ebola - Major objectives of the World Health
Organization roadmap (28 August 2014)
- Achieve full coverage with an Ebola intervention package in countries
with widespread transmission
- Ensure rapid and comprehensive interventions in countries with an
initial case or localised transmission
- Strengthen preparedness of all countries – especially those in close
contact with areas with intense transmission
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implied larger medical centres, survivor clinics, and
measures to avoid malaria patients going to hospitals,
such as the distribution of antimalarial drugs at commu-
nity level. In parallel, knowledge transfer was taking
place, for staff within MSF and for other organisations
involved in the response.
Looking at lessons learned, it should be considered
that this outbreak had more cases than the total of all
previous EVD outbreaks. MSF had never had to manage
more than 40 beds or two medical centres before, had
never been confronted by a new disease crossing bor-
ders, and had never had staff infected. The first lesson is
that qualified HCWs continued to volunteer with MSF
throughout the crisis; there was no recruitment problem.
The second lesson is that some specific places are par-
ticularly dangerous, such as triage points, which are dan-
gerous for staff where many of the infections probably
occurred. Triage areas and suspect areas tend to group
together people with symptoms that could be either
EVD or malaria. It is therefore vitally important to sup-
ply individual rooms, with low risk corridors leading
through high-risk areas. Structures allowing EVD patient
to be visited with no risk for cross-transmission are also
critical (see Fig. 1). The ETC in Foya, managed by MSF,
with safe corridors leading through the high-risk zone,
was the only setting where the outbreak was brought
under control within three months. With hindsight,
most actors in the field would agree that the inter-
national reaction to the EVD outbreak was too slow.
Although this requires further research, the existence of
a treatment might have accelerated the response. In any
case, another lesson learned is that, facing epidemics
with high transmission and fatality rates, experimental
treatments need to be made available very quickly.
Finally, the importance of basic infection prevention
and control (IPC) measures cannot be overstated. The
majority of primary and secondary care facilities in the
three most affected countries did not have basic IPC in
place when the epidemic began. This clearly facilitated
Ebola virus transmission. MSF staff in the field observed
that basic IPC measures were still lacking in August-
September 2015 in several clinics in rural areas. IPC
should therefore be pinpointed as a key area for inter-
national investment and concern.
The response in Sierra Leone
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jX4xpgMbCiU
Under the umbrella of the United Nations and with
the full agreement and cooperation of the national gov-
ernments involved, it can be said that France (as well as
French NGOs) played an important role in the Ebola re-
sponse in Guinea, while the USA played an important role
in Liberia and the United Kingdom (UK) in Sierra Leone.
Almost exactly two months after the declaration of the
EVD outbreak in Guinea, on 22 March 2014, Sierra
Leone confirmed that it was also affected, on 24 May
2014. The UK set up a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force
(JIATF) led by the UK Department for International
Development, including the Ministry of Defence, and
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to provide the plan-
ning, infrastructure, training and management required
to scale up the response. Work was carried out in close
collaboration with the Government of Sierra Leone to
ensure coordination at national and district level, and
support for the UN to tackle systemic issues.
An initial objective was to increase the number of
treatment beds, which meant creating physical infra-
structure using local contractors and military oversight,
while ensuring adequate supplies and making sure that
staff would be available to deliver treatment. Community
Care Centres (with safe isolation beds) were set up,
where individuals could present with early symptoms for
early isolation, testing and referral. Laboratories were
created to speed up diagnosis of EVD. IPC measures, so-
cial mobilisation, contact tracing and safe burial services
were implemented to reduce the number of people
needing treatment. Support was provided for robust
Fig. 1 Ebola treatment centre (ETC), Redemption Hospital, Monrovia,
Liberia. Man-made, inexpensive structures allowing for parents and
relatives to visit of Ebola virus disease patients and bring them food
and other personal items without risking close contact. The wooden
structures allow the maintenance of a critical distance between EVD
patient and visitors to be respected (photo, D. Pittet)
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contingency planning and regional preparedness to avoid
spread to the wider region.
In September 2014, around 500 new cases were being
declared every week in Sierra Leone alone, and some sce-
narios foresaw an exponential spread. In the field, the per-
ception was that the international community had not
moved early enough, and that the response was too slow.
Nevertheless, on 19 November 2014, a JIATF was set up
under UK coordination, with contributions from Canada,
Norway and South Korea. The task force included civilian
and military personnel, under civilian control.
When the task force arrived in Freetown, most bodies
of EVD victims were not buried. The army of Sierra
Leone responded efficiently to the challenge of ensuring
safe and dignified burials, with the support of the task
force. More generally, one of the lessons learned from
the EVD epidemic is that there is an advantage in creat-
ing a rapid civilian-military response. Another lesson is
that humanitarian, healthcare and even military sectors
need to learn to work together, especially at district and
community level – because this is where struggles
against threats such as Ebola are lost or won.
Linkages between the Ebola crisis and infection
control
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BTVysm-et00
The 2014–2015 EVD epidemic was complex because it
transited rapidly between rural and urban areas and across
borders, in a post-war environment marked by poverty
and low literacy levels. The three most affected countries
were lacking in infrastructure for transport, clean water,
sanitation and public health. Furthermore, certain cultural
practices and customs (especially around burials) were
likely to fuel transmission. This situation was compounded
by poor adherence to International Health Regulations
and a belated response by the international community.
Specifically, the absence of basic IPC measures can be
identified as a key area that led the epidemic to become
so complex and widespread. In the three most involved
countries, the situation before the epidemic began was
already unsatisfactory, in the community as well as in
healthcare settings.
In March 2015, WHO published an investigation of
over 66,000 healthcare facilities in 54 low and middle-
income countries, showing that 38 % had no clean water
source, 19 % had no improved sanitation, and 35 %
lacked access to soap and water for handwashing [21].
In the WHO AFRO Region as a whole, only 58 % of
healthcare facilities had a controlled water supply in a
500 m radius, 84 % had adequate sanitation and 64 %
had access to soap. Figures for the three countries most
affected by the EVD epidemic are probably in the same
range, however many of the statistics are either outdated
or unavailable. The most important fact is that it is
practically impossible to set up infection control mea-
sures without access to clean water, that “adequate sani-
tation” often amounts to a single toilet for an entire
hospital, and that even access to soap remains a signifi-
cant challenge for many hospitals.
A confidential assessment of over 100 public and private
healthcare centres was carried out in February 2015. Re-
sults were not necessarily applicable to the whole of the
three affected countries; however, WHO found that sev-
eral key indicators were lacking. Over half of the surveyed
facilities did not had secured access to clean water or elec-
tricity, nor did they had a functioning incinerator. Less
than one quarter of the centres had isolation facilities and
only half had triage facilities. Waste management was also
found to be lacking in most centres. Although some posi-
tive elements were noted, such as adequate training of
healthcare staff and good injection safety procedures, the
situation as a whole was clearly unsatisfactory.
Another key lesson learned concerns communication,
which becomes difficult when key actors come under the
dual influence of fear and time constraints. In such situa-
tions, it is of paramount importance to adhere to stan-
dards and to remain evidence-based when editing the
numerous guidance documents that must be published
during the course of any major outbreak. During the
course of the 2014–2015 EVD epidemic, there was a
media obsession for PPE, while other very important mea-
sures such as hand hygiene, clean water or functioning
toilets were rarely mentioned. Because PPE is an import-
ant measure for EVD control, WHO issued rapid guid-
ance on the subject during the course of the epidemic,
based on expert consultations [22]. Using a similar rapid
consultation process, WHO issued interim guidance at
the end of 2014 suggesting that routine spraying using
chlorine solutions should not be recommended.
Infection rates among HCWs were intolerably high dur-
ing the course of the EVD outbreak, with levels up to 42
times higher than for the general population [23–25]. Lack
of triage and isolation facilities have been pinpointed as key
areas for improvement, as well as previously mentioned
IPC measures. Finally, the EVD outbreak, however tragic,
may be viewed as an opportunity for improving hygiene in
healthcare and community settings, using culturally sensi-
tive methods based on social mobilisation and partner
coordination at local, national and international levels.




An intervention coordinated in 2014 in Liberia by the
Swiss government enabled the local production of
alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR) solutions. ABHR can be
defined as the first step of the IPC strategy, and have
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been shown effective on Ebola virus [26, 27]. The agree-
ment and support of the Liberian authorities was ob-
tained, as well as the validation of the WHO-ABHR
formulation. In close collaboration with the Ministry of
Health, three hospitals were selected: a mother and child
institution, a major city hospital and a rural healthcare
centre.
The intervention was devised in close collaboration
with the University of Geneva Hospitals (HUG) and the
WHO Collaborating Centre on Patient Safety at the Uni-
versity of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine,
which delivered ten ready-to-use kits to produce the
WHO-ABHR. Each kit contained 1500 small plastic bot-
tles, cans of glycerine and peroxide, an ethanol metre, la-
boratory equipment and some jerry cans. It was
necessary to buy ethanol locally, because it cannot be
shipped by air due to security regulations. In September
2014, it proved possible to find 220,000 l within Sierra
Leone. A two-day training programme was set up and
deployed over the initial three pilot hospitals and then a
further seven hospitals, mainly in rural areas. Quality
control and project evaluation were ensured.
A first group of twenty pharmacists was trained in No-
vember 2014, leading to each of the three hospitals pro-
ducing over 1000 ABHR bottles. Strong motivation and
considerable pride were observed in project participants.
The staff of the participating hospitals was informed;
monitoring showed that over 90 % of staff in each insti-
tution were aware of the project.
It is clear that measures enabling healthcare centres
and populations to produce ABHR locally will be useful
beyond the epidemic. It is therefore important to ascer-
tain what capacity is already present to help create such
solutions. In Guinea, there is currently no industrial pro-
duction capacity for ethanol. In order to achieve produc-
tion in this country, an option may be to revive the local
sugar cane distillation industry, by opening a distillery or
reopening one that was closed a few years before. Such a
development would increase the autonomy and long-
term sustainability of this project.
Follow-up missions conducted in Liberia and in
Guinea in October/November 2015 confirmed the sus-
tainability of the project regarding the local production
of ABHR, including quality control, and called for the
necessity to train locals in IPC (www.tinyurl.com/Ebola-
LocalABHR). Adaptation of infection prevention educa-
tion approach is illustrated in Fig. 2a to e). Furthermore,
there was no nurse and no physician trained in IPC in
Liberia before the EVD outbreak. As part of the Swiss-
supported project, a Liberian nurse received a specific
training in IPC between June and October 2015, and is
currently setting up a curriculum for IPC in Liberia with
support of the Ministry of Health, which has set up a na-
tional task force for IPC.
Community engagement
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UXjlJKQ5qtw
The response to the EVD epidemic demonstrated the
need to improve the cultural congruence of interven-
tions and to empower the community; those are critical
for success. Disease outbreak and control require a
co-created environment of cultural humility, reciprocal
trust and respect, co-learning, community empowering
action.
Researchers based in South Africa developed the CARE
model, with practice-based evidence and key steps.
Such a protocol aims at maintaining culture while
describing risks and dispelling myths. It aims at avoiding
bodily contact while ensuring sufficient time and space for
praying, singing and/or dancing when the body of a family
member is taken away.
Fig. 2 a Ebola treatment centre (ETC.), Redemption Hospital,
Monrovia, Liberia. Waiting room in triage area with basic infection
prevention measures for patients, relative and visitors (more details
in b to e) (photo, D. Pittet). b to e Ebola treatment centre (ETC.),
Redemption Hospital, Monrovia, Liberia. Waiting room in triage area
with basic infection prevention measures for patients, relatives and
visitors illustrating possible modes of transmission of the Ebola virus,
through direct contact (b), and body fluid exposure (ie. such as
vomit) (c), sexual intercourse (d), and breast feeding (e) (photo,
D. Pittet)
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In the context of the 2014–2015 EVD epidemic, the
CARE framework was used to promote IPC community-
engaged measures. Interventions were branded re-
sponses rather than interventions, in order to emphasise
that the community is part of the solution. Based on
practice-based evidence [28], the approach draws on
participatory approaches. The key steps are indicated in
Table 3. Most importantly, a process of community
assets mapping creates an inventory of capacities rather
than a bundle of deficits or pathologies. The community
must be able to ensure prevention, treatment and self-
care in collaboration with local government. This ap-
proach requires field testing in various settings. How-
ever, the flexibility and reflexivity of the framework
would make it potentially applicable in other settings.
A role for anthropologists
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ml02V6biT0
A role for anthropologists emerged during the EVD
epidemic because of a context of community resistance
against physicians, especially in Guinea. Frequent phys-
ical contact with deceased people, surrounded by myths
as well as social, religious, political and cultural conflicts,
and confounded by the influence of traditional healers,
all had negative consequences in the context of this epi-
demic. There were several reports of vandalism, demonstra-
tions and even physical violence; this led to violent deaths
of HCWs in Guinea during the course of the EVD crisis.
The objective of anthropologists in the epidemic re-
sponse was to understand why and how resistance to
HCWs developed. They deployed a multimodal strategy
based on sound knowledge of local history and customs
and appropriate choice of entry persons to observe
social practices and discuss with communities. The
objective was to find common grounds between the
needs of the community and healthcare priorities.
In April 2014, a first group of healthcare experts was
deployed with an anthropologist in an area where MSF
had just installed an ETC, in a context of almost 100 %
mortality. There were rumours that MSF was killing
people and an anti-MSF demonstration had been
planned. Anthropological activities with communities
used community leaders to sensitise the population.
Then, central government local representatives orga-
nised a large public meeting. As a result, the anti-MSF
demonstration was cancelled.
In conclusion, community resistance can represent a
considerable challenge in the context of emergency re-
sponses to disease outbreaks such as EVD. In such a con-
text, anthropological interventions represent an emerging
good practice and can bring significant results in terms of
enabling the response against the disease, protecting
HCWs and achieving buy-in from local communities.
Diagnosis and treatment
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HjC8UtzVbY
Diagnostic issues are affected by biosafety regulations
that need to be followed when investigating viruses such
as the Ebola virus. When a patient presents with clinical
symptoms, he usually already has a high viral load [9, 29].
Cultures are not performed in clinical routine for such vi-
ruses. Reference segments (conserved targets) in the viral
genome are needed for PCR-based diagnosis, although it
may be necessary to adapt assays to the genetic drift of
the virus. Some assays were used both in the field and in
high resource settings during the epidemic in West Africa
[10, 30], despite the lack of detailed clinical validations in
scientific publications.
Among lessons learned during this epidemic, the fact
that primers and probes for RT-PCR are not being
shared is a problem that needs to be solved at inter-
national level. Further issues were dicted by the fact that
viral kinetics are not fully understood. It is accepted that
viral load starts to decrease around day 6 after onset of
disease, somewhat earlier in survivors than in non-
survivors [29]. Moreover, RT-PCR accuracy is limited by
limits of detection and quantification, and it is not
uncommon to obtain both positive and negative results in
the same sample when viral loads reach low levels [30].
During the 2014–2015 outbreak, it has been common
to discharge patients as soon as blood sample proved
negative by RT-PCR [31]. However, Ebola virus can per-
sist in immunologically protected body compartments
[32–34]. Among the various assays on the market, so-
Table 3 Promoting infection prevention community-engaged measures against Ebola virus disease, 8 key steps (CARE framework)
- Prepare to enter the affected community with a respected local leader
- Enter the community with cultural humility and critical self-reflection about one’s own biases and beliefs
- Identify key male and female community leaders who are influential in decision making
- Empower the community leaders
- Organise regular meetings where medical teams can be invited as participants rather than conveners
- Assess to what extent communities are ready for change (knowledge of the issue and of the efforts involved in the response, leadership attitude)
- Map the various groups that have resources and insights into the situation (religious groups, children, etc.)
- Plan for sustainability, i.e. after the departure of the medical team. Most importantly, a process
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called loop-mediated isothermal amplification assays
may prove interesting in the future [35]. Rapid point-of-
care tests, are based either on genetic (PCR) or immuno-
graphic methods. The ReBOV antigen rapid test has
been cleared for emergency use by WHO and the US
Federal Drug Administration (FDA) in February 2015
[36]. However, its overall performance (sensitivity 92 %,
specificity 85 %) may be a challenge in settings with high
disease prevalence.
Direct acting antiretroviral therapies emerged with
ZMAb, a cocktail of three monoclonal antibodies, shown
to be efficient against Ebola virus in non-human pri-
mates [37]. ZMAb was not designed for clinical settings
and is still in an experimental stage although it was de-
livered to at least 6 patients in the context of the current
epidemic [30, 38]. Zmapp, a combination of chimeric
antibodies targeting three different epitopes on Ebola
virus which proved 100 % protective in guinea pigs and
non-human primates inoculated with the Kikwit variant
of the virus [39]. Animal trials have been conducted
using the Makona variant with similar results regarding
efficacy, despite there being at least 26 non-synonymous
mutations on epitopes recognised by the monoclonal
antibodies in the drug [40]. Indeed, the Ebola virus is
evolving and mutating constantly. The concept of
Zmapp is that by targeting several epitopes at the same
time the chance of the drug being efficacious in humans
will be increased. MIL-77, manufactured by a Chinese
company, is another cocktail of humanized monoclonal
antibodies produced in Chinese hamster ovary cells. It
has been used as post-exposure prophylaxis agent in
patients presenting with high-exposure risk [41]. There
is currently no published information in the inter-
national literature that demonstrates the efficacy of
MIL-77 in animal models or in humans.
Favipiravir, approved in Japan against influenza, is a
broad-spectrum antiviral pyrazinamide derivative that
functions as a viral RNA polymerase inhibitor [42, 43].
Preliminary results from a non-randomised clinical study
in Guinea showed a reduction in mortality among
treated patients, and especially among those without
renal failure on admission and with lower viral load [44].
TKM Ebola is a cocktail of small interfering RNAs that
target various viral proteins. It is efficacious in protect-
ing Rhesus monkeys [45, 46]. It has been used in a few
patients [47] and a clinical trial has been conducted in
Sierra Leone. Plasma from convalescent individuals has
been shown to be protective in non-human primates,
and in a few humans [48]. There has been compassion-
ate use of this approach during the current epidemic
[47, 49, 50] but first results of a large-scale clinical trial
showed no benefit in survival [51]. Brincidofovir was
studied in a clinical trial in Liberia that had to be
stopped due to the decline in the total number of cases.
It is efficacious against DNA viruses; [52] its activity
against RNA viruses is unknown, and no further clinical
trial is planned at the present time. Synthetic antisense
oligonucleotide analogues (resistant to RNase) called
PMOplus have also been preven effective in animal
models [53, 54]. There are around 50 more examples of
experimental drugs not used in clinical practice at this
time. For example, in Foya in 2014, MSF found that
artesunate-amodiaquine reduced mortality [55].
In summary, perhaps as many as 50 drugs are cur-
rently in the research and development pipeline; there is
however no current validated treatment. Pilot studies are
needed. They should be randomised controlled trials
wherever possible, but other trial setups may be neces-
sary because randomisation is not always feasible, eth-
ical, nor fast enough.
Ebola and HIV
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2o7eErripP4
At least 200,000 people are estimated to be living with
HIV in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, one-quarter of
whom are currently taking antiretroviral therapy. The
continuity of HIV prevention and care was an important
issue during the 2014–2015 EVD epidemic. Individuals
were reluctant to attend any medical facility due to fear
of Ebola infection and mistrust of medical services.
Visits to HIV facilities in Conakry, the capital of Guinea,
plummeted: the proportion of people not going to their
HIV visit, and who had still not gone to one 90 days
later, went from zero to 42 % between April and Decem-
ber 2014 [56].
It is critical to maintain a minimum HIV service pack-
age during epidemics, including access to male and
female condoms, safe blood transfusion services, access
to antiretroviral therapy, prevention of mother-to-child
transmission, TB/HIV services and post-exposure
prophylaxis.
In terms of lessons learned, the EVD outbreak reso-
nated strongly with HIV researchers and practitioners in
West Africa and elsewhere because of similarities linked
to the two viruses having a zoonotic origin in Africa and
large societal impacts linked to stigma and discrimin-
ation. Other points perceived as being in common are
the importance of surveillance, an elusive vaccine or
cure, and challenges linked to procurement and logistics
and the shortage of HCWs. It comes as no surprise that
many HIV researchers and practitioners were among the
volunteers working in ETC or clinical trial sites. Interest-
ingly, an important aspect of the Ebola prevention
vocabulary was ABC, for Avoid Body Contact. This
resonates with the “Abstinence, Be faithful, use a Condom”
used in the global response against HIV (Fig. 3).
Lessons from the HIV epidemic that could be of use
when considering the EVD outbreak include: the
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importance of interventions to reduce stigma, the need for
widespread screening programmes including point-of-care
testing, engaging affected communities and ensuring con-
tinued access to treatment. Antiretroviral therapy adhesion
adherence clubs – as developed by MSF in South Africa –
have been used as an inspiration for ETCs in West Africa.
Another important issue is gathering evidence to
improve care. Thanks to standardised monitoring forms
introduced by MSF at the beginning of the EVD epi-
demic, it has been possible to obtain vitally important
cohort data showing the effects of various antiretroviral
treatments on EVD. These monitoring forms clearly do
not correspond to an ideal study design. However, ex-
perience with HIV in the 1980s has shown that rando-
mised placebo-controlled trials are not always possible.
Ebola virus disease survivors
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=omImULFapeM
In June 2015, there were already more than 17,000 EVD
survivors in West Africa. Sierra Leone had the highest
number of survivors (around 4000) [57], followed by
Liberia and Guinea. Despite growing numbers, little atten-
tion was being directed towards the continued treatment
and rehabilitation of these persons with specific needs.
Although EVD was first described almost 40 years be-
fore the 2014–2015 outbreak, few articles concentrate
on sequelae in survivors. A WHO report published in
1976 emphasised that “Those who did recovered did so
slowly and painfully. Their appearance remained charac-
teristic with deep-set eyes, drawn faces, a stooped walk
and cachexia. Their condition slowly improved over
several weeks, but many complained of pain and weak-
ness for 6–8 weeks after discharge.” [58] Despite this
knowledge, by June 2015, only few more studies could
be found on the topic of EVD survivors [59–65], and
only two of them are controlled studies [63, 66].
From March to June 2015, a team of the University
of Geneva Hospitals (HUG) worked with MSF at the
MSF survivor clinic of Freetown, to investigate the
challenges faced by EVD survivors. A total of more
than 160 survivors from the Western Area of Sierra
Leone were followed there. Medical and mental health
consultations were carried out, as well as prevention
of STD and sexual transmission of EVD. Survivors
were referred to the HIV national program to be tested.
Local psychologists proposed personal counselling, family
support and group discussions. Local support in the
community was sought for in order to handle issues re-
lated to stigmatisation [67].
One important issue was that so-called “Certificates of
discharge” were the only proof of survival status. These
documents, issued first by the ETC. themselves then by
government authorities, give access to free care and
allow the bearer to work for an ETC. or in health pro-
motion. However, they do not mean that the person is
no longer infectious, and in practice the verification of
such documents has proved difficult due to lack of
communication between hospitals and to the presence
of forged documents in the community.
In Sierra Leone, patients were discharged from ETCs
when they had had one negative blood RT-PCR test,
presented no acute symptoms and were considered au-
tonomous in their movements. However, the Ebola virus
is known to persist in various human body fluids. Virus
has been detected in semen up to 284 days after onset of
disease [33], and has been cultivated up to 82 days [34].
Aqueous humour of the eye has been tested positive for
10 weeks after onset of disease, in a patient presenting
with severe uveitis, while no virus could be retrieved in
the tears/conjunctival swab [64]. RT-PCR tests can de-
tect the virus for days or even weeks after the last posi-
tive blood test in a variety of body fluids or tissues:
sweat (24 days) [68], vaginal swab (21 days) [34], amni-
otic fluid (15 days) [69], breast milk (8 days) [32] and
saliva (4 days) [34], urine (36 days) [70]. A nurse treated
in the UK presented close to death with symptoms of
advanced meningitis has been tested positive for Ebola
virus in cerebro-spinal fluid 9 months after onset of
disease [71]. There is no data in the literature on persist-
ence of the virus in intra-articular fluid.
Two questions may be raised by these data. The first is
that IPC issues remain vitally important after discharge
from hospital. The second is that EVD may be consid-
ered as a sexually transmitted disease. Indeed, a case has
been described of a woman infected by Ebola virus and
whose only risk factor was a sexual activity with a sur-
vivor [59, 72].
Post-EVD complications include neuropsychological
disorders (headache, irritability, memory loss, depression
and other symptoms related to traumatic stress
disorder), hair loss, hearing loss, thyroiditis, arthralgia/
myalgia, anorexia, abdominal pain, myocarditis/pericar-
ditis, tachycardia, skin desquamation and skin rashes
[60–63, 65, 66, 73–77]. Ocular complications are
encountered in up to 60 % of survivors, including sight-
threatening uveitis, which have been shown to be more
frequent in patients with higher viral load at admis-
sion [74].
Among the survivors followed in Sierra Leone [67],
preliminary data showed that most frequent symptoms
at first visit included suspected ocular complications
Ebola ABC Avoid Body Contact
HIV ABC Abstinence, Be faithful, use a Condom
Fig. 3 Similarities between Ebola and HIV prevention vocabulary
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(37 %), joint pain (39 %), headache (45 %), fatigue
(27 %), anorexia (26 %), myalgia (24 %), insomnia (9 %)
hair loss (10 %) or suspected cardiac complications
(4 %). The most common ocular complaint was uveitis.
Anterior uveitis and panuveitis were the most common
subtypes of the disease. Among patients who attended a
mental health consultation, a majority said they felt
unhappy, nervous, tense and/or worried. In this respect,
the lack of qualified psychologists is a major impediment
for the continued treatment and rehabilitation of EVD
survivors, in Sierra Leone and elsewhere.
In summary, EVD survivors suffer from physical com-
plications compounded by a range of psychological and
social problems and challenges. The physiopathology of
the post-EVD syndrome remains unknown. Research is
still needed to understand the full range of sequelae/
complications and how the Ebola virus can persist in
immunologically protected body fluids of survivors.
Ebola patient treated in Geneva
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upxyxopNKDc
The HUG started preparing for receiving a possible
EVD patient in April 2014. Personnel from the intensive
care and emergency departments were trained for EVD
ahead of time (see video “Ebola PPE coaching” at http://
tinyurl.com/EbolaPPEcoaching). Training and simula-
tions were carried out long before it was known whether
a patient might ever be admitted. Furthermore, the Swiss
National Reference Centre for Emerging Viral Diseases,
part of the Laboratory of Virology at HUG, was experi-
enced in PCR-based investigation of viruses such as Ebola.
In August 2014, as the epidemic was growing in West
Africa, HCWs were increasingly becoming infected. One
month after the WHO call on 8 August 2014, specific
training carried out within 3 weeks in Cuba enabled the
first wave of 163 Cuban physicians to be deployed in
West Africa. In November 2014, there were over 11,000
EVD cases declared, more than 5000 deaths, and the
epidemic was spilling over into neighbouring countries.
On 18 November 2014, WHO called the Swiss Federal
Office of Public Health to suggest the transfer of a pa-
tient with EVD. The transfer took place on 20 Novem-
ber. The patient was admitted to HUG on 21 November
with high fever and swollen face features, and was in a
semi-delirious state. Central and bladder catheters were
already in place. Three hours after the patient’s arrival at
the hospital, he received his first medication. We refer
the reader to a complete description of the clinical and
laboratory observation published elsewhere [30].
Between August 2014 and June 2015, a total of 27
EVD patients were treated in Europe or North America,
among which 20 were evacuated – “medivaced” – after
being infected in West Africa (the others declared the
disease while already in Europe or North America).
Weekly conference calls took place between the various
centres treating the patients to exchange experiences
and learn from each other.
Among lessons learned is that it is critical to be pre-
pared ahead of time and that teamwork between disci-
plines is essential, in particular between virology, IPC,
and emergency and intensive care medicine experts. Pro-
cedures need to already be in place for patient transfers
to and within the hospital, practical arrangements in-
cluding food and beverages, toilets and waste disposal.
Laboratory testing including blood tests was carried out
in patient’s room (see video “Ebola In Room Laboratory”
at http://tinyurl.com/EbolaInRoomLab) thanks to point-
of-care devices, except for the RT-PCR, which was per-
formed at Laboratory of Virology. It has been suggested
that entry and exit points to a secure room should be
different. At HUG, this was not the case because of
architectural constraints; it was not considered a major
problem, although it complicated waste management.
Altogether, some 70 HCWs were involved in the team
taking care of the single patient admitted at HUG.
Preparing for an EVD patient is a significant burden
for any hospital that has to continue functioning while
all events and procedures linked to EVD are taking
place. In particular, advanced and well-trained IPC spe-
cialists are needed to develop recommendations and
train personnel. Four sectors had to be prepared for the
possible admission of an EVD patient: critical care,
emergency wards for adults and children, as well as in-
ternal medicine. A one-hour practical training module
was set up at HUG and was delivered to 250 HCWs. A
total of 20 supervisors, mostly IPC staff, were trained
and on duty for training supervision. Following train-
ings, staff had the possibility to repeat donning and doff-
ing procedures on multiple occasions and permanent
dedicated locations with PPE material were set up to
allow individual or supervised training sessions to occur.
Simulations and simulation sessions’ debriefings were
also organized. Finally, a procedure was set out in case
of an accidental exposure of a staff member to the virus.
After the arrival of the patient, three intensive care
nurses worked in 3 × 8 h shifts. The team consisted of
nine nurses: two in the room with the patient and three
outside for supervision and preparedness. A so-called
“buddy system” was put in place, as well as supervision
by IPC team leaders. A total of 5 ICP nurses (3 in the
morning; 3 in the afternoon; 1 at night) and at least 1
ICP senior physician (including at night) were necessary
for continuous supervision and support of the staff
entering and exiting the patient room (see Ebola training
video recorded in real life while the patient was treated
at HUG: “Ebola: entering and exiting the room” at
https://youtu.be/PFbPL7_jEQY). Around 2500 nursing
hours were spent with this single patient [78]. The final
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cleaning of the room after patient discharge requested a
total of 15 HCWs who proceeded to the decontamin-
ation of the dedicated area and to the cleansing of the
used materials, equipments and environment in one day.
Finally, sustained media attention is to be expected,
with the risk of overpowering the hospital press offices and
local health authorities. The HUG therefore contracted a
team of science writers in advance, to issue timely and
scientifically sound press releases in English and French
throughout the treatment of this patient.
Caring for Ebola patients in Washington, DC
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9a26KVrWU38
There are similarities in preparation and planning
among the units used for EVD patients in Europe and
North America. The high containment unit at NIH near
Washington DC, was one of the three hospitals in the
USA (others were in Atlanta and in Nebraska) that was
shortlisted to possibly receive a patient by the US federal
authorities. The NIH had prepared from 2009 a safe con-
tainment room for patients with any infectious conditions
[79]. It contains four rooms, one of which is a high-level
containment isolation room. In addition, the unit is sup-
ported by a room with one large and two small autoclaves.
Table 4 lists the main elements identified as success
factors for handling an EVD patient. When it was
thought that a patient might actually be admitted, the
atmosphere changed. An internal call for healthcare
volunteers was highly successful and a flexible staffing
model was developed. A “buddy system” was used, with
two nurses in the room for a critically-ill patient, one in
the anteroom and one at the nurses’ station. Trained
observers were used and rapidly proved to be critical for
ensuring the adequacy of donning and doffing proce-
dures. Anticipated laboratory requirements were estab-
lished. Daily debriefings established what worked and what
could be improved. A clear, transparent communication
plan was set up, with neighbouring institutions including
other hospitals and schools.
One of the patients arrived at a different airport from
the three with which the NIH had worked out proce-
dures. Because the NIH had not been in contact with
the mayor or council of the county involved, these activ-
ities had to be conducted as the patient was arriving.
Another major issue was managing hysteria and anxiety,
some of which was similar to what had occurred in the
1980s when HIV patients were admitted to the same
hospital. Interestingly, the MSF and WHO declarations
about the epidemic provoked less media interest than
the arrival of EVD patients on American soil. Altogether,
12 patients were treated in North-America and ten of
them survived. Being able to provide care for these pa-
tients in environments in which physiological and other
studies could be conducted during the provision of care
provides an opportunity to learn more about the patho-
genesis and pathophysiology of the disease.
Ebola preparedness in New York
Although there was no federal plan for New York to re-
ceive EVD patients, the city had procedures in place be-
cause of its strategic position as the main entry point to
the USA. New York had an experience of media frenzy
when, in October 2014, an American physician who had
been working on Ebola in Liberia declared symptoms
compatible with EVD. On 23 October 2014, he reported
himself to public health authorities and was promptly
transferred to Bellevue hospital. The following day, in
neighbouring New Jersey, a nurse returning from Sierra
Leone was confined to a quarantine tent for three days
despite having no EVD-specific symptoms. Subsequent
testing proved that she was virus-free. When she suc-
ceeded in freeing herself from that situation, authorities
in her state of Maine also attempted to quarantine her.
The male patient, who identified himself as Dr Craig
Spencer, subsequently wrote a critical position paper on
the attitude of the media and of key political figures to-
wards EVD [80]. In his view, the threat of a 21-day quar-
antine may cause sick people to conceal symptoms,
defer seeking treatment, misreport their exposure or
alter their travel plans to avoid quarantine. Also, Spencer
underlined that allowing restrictions such as quarantines
to occur when they are not in line with official public
health recommendations (issued by the CDC for the
USA) undermines and erodes confidence in the ability of
citizens to respond cohesively to public health crises.
Other critics believe that there was too much confidence
that the USA and its institutions could handle EVD cases.
There was a failure to understand how a fatal EVD case in
Texas, which occurred on 8 October 2014, could ignite
fear and many misconceptions across the country.
Table 4 Caring for Ebola patients in the Northern hemisphere;
main success factors
- Designating a single individual who is in charge
- Team building with input from every team member
- Institutional leadership
- Developing efficient procedures and precautions
- Developing and testing standard operating procedures (and modifying
them as needed)
- Using a “buddy system”
- Training of observers for ensuring the adequacy of donning and
doffing procedures
- Anticipating on laboratory requirements
- Daily debriefings (once the patient is admitted)
- Clear and transparent communication
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Treatment in Sierra Leone and Geneva
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq_G1Rta2EU
A comparison of the handling of EVD patients in
Switzerland and Sierra Leone by physicians who took care
of such patients in both countries may seem speculative,
but can be useful if the objective is to achieve health
equity (Table 5). In the well-equipped isolation room in
the intensive care unit at HUG, a large number of staff
were available to treat a single patient (see above). A
complete virology laboratory was at hand, with reverse
transcription real-time PCR (real-time RT-PCR), ELISA
assays for IgG and IgM, and haematological and chemical
tests that could be performed at the bedside. The patient
had access to two experimental treatments: the ZMAb
cocktail containing three EBOV-glycoprotein-specific
neutralising monoclonal antibodies and the antiviral favi-
piravir (see above). An important point is that a lot of
personnel and time were necessary, to treat a single
patient. Graphs were produced every day and sometimes
several times a day, to monitor the dynamics of EVD
and body responses. For example, it could be ob-
served that the emergence of the IgG response in this
patient took 11 days, with a rapid increase in the IgG
titres thereafter [30].
One of the responsible physicians at HUG also went
to the Prince of Wales Ebola treatment centre (ETC.) in
Freetown, Liberia. This MSF-run hospital consisted of 4
tents and could handle up to 100 patients. Many pa-
tients would arrive on foot at the triage area. Suspected
cases were separated from each other and then, accord-
ing to the RT-PCR result, were directed to the intensive
care tent or to the oral tent, depending on the clinical
phase of each patient.
Among the key differences between the two settings
are the high number of trained staff who are available
per patient in well-resourced countries. This is one of
the reasons why clinics in Europe and North America
were able to tailor treatments, whereas in Africa it
was always necessary to follow protocols. Equipment
was clearly more readily available in Geneva, although
interestingly the same diagnostic RT-PCR kit was
used in both locations. The main and most shocking
difference was the case fatality rate: on the 27 cases
treated in Europe and North America, it was 18.5 %
in high-resource countries against around 50 % in
West Africa.
For the future, it is necessary to define life-saving
measures to be rolled out as a priority in low-resource
settings. It is not known if the priority should be aggres-
sive monitoring and supportive care, or if the limited
resources should be concentrated on delivering anti-
retroviral therapy. Similarly, not enough is known about
the pros and cons of using a central venous catheter,
which is very useful for blood sampling and aggressive
rehydration, but which implies risks associated with
device use and concerns about staff safety.
Vaccines against Ebola virus
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0BjCsrApth4
When the Ebola crisis was recognised as an inter-
national emergency in August 2014, the exponential in-
crease in the number of cases and the increasing numbers
of HCWs becoming infected led many public health
experts to think that the only answer to the epidemic
might be a vaccine. These thoughts led to a race towards
an Ebola vaccine.
Table 5 Similarities and differences regarding Ebola patient management at the University of Geneva Hospitals, Switzerland, and in
a MSF Ebola Treatment Center in Freetown, Sierra Leone
University of Geneva Hospitals Freetown MSF ETC.
EVD diagnostics Real-time RT-PCR (Altona kit):
Daily viral load estimation, in
plasma and other body fluids
Real-time RT-PCR (Altona kit):
One for diagnosis, one for discharge
Point-of-care lab tests Haematology
Blood gases
Basic coagulation assessment
Biochemistry (including CRP, electrolytes,
CK, renal function and liver tests)
Malaria and Dengue RDTs
Biochemistry (including CRP,
electrolytes, CK, renal function and liver tests)









Peripheral venous line (not all patients)
Nasal oxygen delivery (2 devices for the whole ETC.)
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At that time, only two Ebola vaccine candidates had
been shown to be 100 % protective in non-human pri-
mates and were available according to good manufactur-
ing practice. Both were vector vaccines expressing the
envelope gene of the Ebola virus Zaire strain. The first
was ChAd3-ZEBOV, a live non-replicating chimpanzee
adenovirus, licenced by NIAID (USA) to the GSK
company [81]. Preliminary trials in the UK, USA, Mali
and Switzerland had shown the vaccine to be safe with
no serious adverse effects (although flu-like symptoms
were frequent) [82–84]. A relatively high dose of 2 ×
1011 plaque-forming units (PFU) was required to induce
antibody responses. Subsequent trials on lower doses
(between 1 × 1010 and 5 × 1010 PFU) were associated
with satisfactory T-cell responses but that were not
sustained for more than a few weeks. Therefore, the
ChAd3-ZEBOV vaccine has been recommended as a
“prime-boost” vaccine requiring at least two doses and a
large primary dose (2 × 1011) for phase II/III trials.
The other Ebola vaccine candidate, rVSV-ZEBOV, is a
live replicating vaccine based on the vesicular stomatitis
virus, whose replicating genes are maintained, and whose
envelope gene is replaced by the EBOV-GP envelope gene
[85]. This vaccine was licensed to NewLink Genetics (and
subsequently to Merck) by the Public Health Agency of
Canada that went on to donate 800 doses to WHO to
accelerate its international evaluation. WHO rapidly set
up the VEBCON consortium containing four trials – in
Gabon, Germany, Kenya and Switzerland – with a total of
250 study volunteers to evaluate the safety profile and
dose selection for this vaccine.
Each of these trials was a phase I placebo-controlled
randomised clinical trial, which relied heavily on the
generosity of volunteers [86]. For the trial in Switzerland,
regulatory and ethical approval was obtained from three
sources (HUG, Swiss federal authorities and WHO) within
one month. In Geneva, volunteers were randomised to
one of three groups: 107 or 5 × 107 PFU or placebo. After
initial screening, each volunteer received a single dose and
was monitored closely for the ensuing days and weeks.
Each week, 15 subjects were screened, enrolled, immu-
nised and followed every week.
However, on 9 December 2014, a safety-driven
study hold occurred because around 20–25 % of
vaccinees were experiencing joint pain, which was
identified as dose-independent viral arthritis. Another
unexpected event, affecting around 10 % of vaccinees,
was maculopapular rash and vesicular dermatitis on
hands and feet, which was found to be associated
with CD4+ T-cell infiltration. Rare cases of viral vas-
culitis were also observed. The understanding at
present is that the rVSV vector is responsible for
vesicular dermatitis that occurs on infection with the
wild-type virus, but that arthritis and vasculitis are an
intrinsic property of the vaccine [87]. The trial in
Geneva started again on 3 January 2015.
The first published results of the four VEBCON trials
were based on 138 healthy adult volunteers who had all
been followed for at least four weeks [86]. It could be
seen that viremia increased very rapidly – usually within
24 h – among subjects who had received a dose of
several million PFU (doses ranged from 300,000 PFU –
for which viremia increased less – to 3–50 million
PFU where viremia peaked after 1–3 days at several
thousand RNA copies/ml). However, whatever the ini-
tial dose, the virus appeared to have been cleared
from the blood by day 7. Although very few partici-
pants had no adverse events, almost all were mild or
moderate (fever or feverish feeling, flu-like symptoms
including myalgia and fatigue) and lasted no more
than one or two days.
Both adverse events and antibody response were
clearly associated with the dose of vaccine received [87].
This led to the selection of 2 × 107 as the dose of choice
for subsequent phase III trials in West Africa. Three
phase III trials began in West Africa between February
and April 2015. However, because of the (most fortu-
nate) reduction in the number of EVD cases in West Af-
rica, it was not possible to carry out all the clinical trials
that were planned. However, in July 2015, The Lancet
published the first results from a phase 3 cluster-
randomised trial of the rVSV-ZEBOV Ebola virus vac-
cine in Guinea including more than 7,500 indiviuals
[88]. The interim analysis indicates that the vaccine
might be highly efficacious and safe.
At the end of 2015, two candidate vaccines (single-
dose rVSV-ZEBOV and prime/boost ChAd3) have en-
tered phase II/III clinical trials, three other candidates
are in phase I trials (ChAd3/prime boost), Ad26/
prime boost, EBOV virus-like particles with glycopro-
tein) and the pipeline which was empty only months
before is now full of preclinical candidate vaccines.
The 18 months between mid-2014 and the end of
2015 have seen an unprecedented race against the
clock to deliver a safe and efficacious vaccine against
the Ebola virus. It is vitally important to pursue
current efforts to develop such vaccines, because it
would not be tolerable to face another EVD epidemic
without having a safe and efficacious vaccine to offer
at the very least to frontline workers.
Conclusion
This overview concludes that lessons learned from the
2014–2015 EVD epidemic must be used to prepare for the
next outbreak. Among the main lessons learned are that
preparedness needs to be improved globally, health sys-
tems need to be strengthened, especially in rural areas,
and interdisciplinary teams need to be constituted or at
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least planned for ahead of time. This epidemic also raised
the critical question of the reforms needed at a global level
for outbreak prevention and response. The report of the
Harvard Global Health Institute and London School of
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Independent Panel on the
Global Response to Ebola recently published in The
Lancet suggests 10 essential reforms to conduct before the
next pandemic [89]. These recommendations require
high-level leadership political commitment for the pro-
posed roadmap to be translated into concrete actions.
Emerging approaches such as MOOCs and the use of
anthropologists embedded in medical teams have been a
hallmark of the response to this epidemic. In order to
understand and empower local communities in sensitive
areas such as safe burials, there is a strong need for
culturally sensitive approaches which can best be ad-
dressed by social science teams and medical teams work-
ing together, or better with teams including experts from
various fields [89].
In this respect, a lot can be learned from the global re-
sponse to HIV. The Ebola crisis saw a remarkable mobil-
isation of HIV researchers and activists. At short notice,
information about the unfolding EVD epidemic was
presented during HIV conferences. HIV levels were in
the range of 1–2 % of the total population in the 3 coun-
tries most affected by the Ebola virus.
As of December 2015, this epidemic has claimed more
than 11,000 lives and generated more than 17,000 EVD
survivors. Too little is known about the pathogenesis and
the treatment of EVD, so basic and applied research in
this field is urgently required. Data on viral kinetics are
still scarce, but viral load is clearly related to survival. Spe-
cific clinical features of the infection with the Makona
variant may have led to extend the spread of the outbreak.
Moreover, it is clear now that the virus can persist in im-
munologically protected body sites up to 9 months after
an individual has been declared cured. This explains some
of the complications and also poses several questions re-
garding sexual transmission of the disease.
The continued treatment and rehabilitation of the
EVD survivors – who have faced near-death experiences
and some of whom are orphans – is a public health
priority. They commonly experience a “post-Ebola
syndrome”, mainly consisting in debilitating joint pain,
uveitis that can lead to blindness if left untreated, and
psychological issues. The three countries most affected
by the Ebola epidemic have almost no psychologists with
the training necessary to face such a task. And little is
known about how communities can cope with rumours
and fear related to tragic and disruptive events such as
an EVD epidemic. Such problems need to be addressed
within the general framework of health systems recovery
and development, and require integrated medical and
social science approaches.
New cases of Ebola have been confirmed in Guinea
and Liberia just after West Africa has been declared
"Ebola free", and more flare-ups are likely to occur, due
to delayed virus clearance in the survivor popoulation.
One has to highlight the unprecedented commitment of
the international community in developing an effective
vaccine against this dreadful threat.
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Edward Kelley, of the Patient Safety Secretariat at WHO, presented the timeline
of the response to the Ebola virus disease (EVD) crisis. He explains how WHO
set up a roadmap from August 2014 in order to achieve full coverage with a
comprehensive Ebola intervention package across the three most affected
countries. In retrospect, he sees three phases in the epidemic, the third of
which – health systems recovery and strengthening – remains to be
comprehensively addressed.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hFK-Bzy5c6M
Sergey Eremin, of the Infection prevention and control (IPC) team at WHO,
showed how images of healthcare professionals with spectacular protective
clothing stole the limelight from other aspects of IPC during the EVD crisis. A
key lesson learned from this outbreak and from IPC programmes elsewhere
is the importance of IPC assessment tools – some of them electronic –
which can help make the approach to IPC more systematic at community
and healthcare facility levels.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TrBQM-C9CB8
Esther Sterk and Hugues Robert-Nicoud, of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF),
explained how MSF played a key role during all phases of the EVD outbreak,
and especially in its initial phases because MSF was already active in the area
where the outbreak began. Despite experience with almost all the filovirus
epidemics that h occurred over the previous 20 years, MSF had never been
confronted by an outbreak of such complexity and scale. MSF’s approach
and its six-pillar Ebola management system are explained. Lessons learned
are reviewed with a critical perspective.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=el0zhxCCgnQ
Babacar Ndoye, an expert in IPC and microbiology and a consultant for
WHO, gave a talk on the deployment of anthropologists during the response
to the EVD outbreak. The objective was to understand why and how
resistance to health workers developed and to find common ground
between the needs of the community and healthcare priorities. A
multimodal strategy based on knowledge of local history and customs and
appropriate choice of entry persons was used, thus positioning
anthropological interventions as an emerging good practice.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ml02V6biT0
Frederick Marais, of the Western Cape Government and Stellenbosch
University in Cape Town, South Africa, shared insights into the CARE model.
This culturally sensitive framework for engaging local communities is based on
practice-based evidence and has 8 key steps aiming at improving the cultural
congruence of responses without compromising safety. In the context of the
EBV epidemic, the CARE framework was used to promote IPC measures empha-
sising that communities are part of the solution.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UXjlJKQ5qtw
Donal Brown, of UKaid, shared his impressions gathered in the field, while
coordinating the Ebola response in Sierra Leone. When he arrived in
September 2014, the perception was that the international community had
moved too slowly, and too late. He explains how a joint inter-agency task-
force then supported the Government of Sierra Leone in its response to the
outbreak. Among lessons learned are that humanitarian, healthcare and
military sectors can work together, especially at district and community levels.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jX4xpgMbCiU
Olivier Hagon, of the Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit, described how a project
coordinated in Liberia during the autumn of 2014 enabled the local
production of alcohol-based hand rub solutions as well as training
programmes for pharmacists and other healthcare professionals. A follow-up
mission in 2015 confirmed the sustainability of the project regarding the local
production of the hand rub solutions, including quality control, under the aegis
of the Liberian Ministry of Health.
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Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Bgp-twcGHw
Laurent Kaiser, of the Division of infectious diseases of University of Geneva
Hospitals, contributed a detailed explanation on the virology of the Ebola virus,
focusing on biosafety, diagnosis and the various experimental treatments that are
emerging. Current challenges are reviewed, such as the fact that some chemicals
required for diagnosis are not being shared and that further studies are necessary
to understand how the virus multiplies and maintains itself in vivo.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HjC8UtzVbY
Alexandra Calmy, of the HIV unit at the University of Geneva Hospitals,
contributed a “tale of two viruses”. Similarities and differences between Ebola virus
and HIV are reviewed, with a focus on HIV services which need to be maintained
during other epidemics. For the response against Ebola, relevant lessons from HIV
include interventions to reduce stigma, screening programmes, engaging affected
communities and ensuring continued access to treatment.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2o7eErripP4
Manuel Schibler, an infectious diseases physician at the University of Geneva
Hospitals, proposed a comparison of the handling of EVD patients in Switzerland
and Sierra Leone. Among the many differences are the high number of trained
staff available in well-resourced countries, while the RT-PCR diagnostic equipment
turned out to be the same in both settings. The most shocking difference is the
case fatality rate, which is 2.5 times higher in West Africa.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hq_G1Rta2EU
Benedetta Allegranzi, of the WHO Patient safety programme, described
the many linkages between the Ebola crisis and infection prevention and
control (IPC). She explains that one of the reasons why the epidemic was so
complex and severe was a lack of infrastructure for water and sanitation
throughout communities and healthcare centres, compounded by poor adherence
to International Health Regulations and a belated international response.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BTVysm-et00
Jérôme Pugin, a critical care physician at the University of Geneva Hospitals
(HUG), explained how a Cuban doctor medivaced from West Africa was
treated – successfully – in a specialised unit in Geneva, within a hospital
which had to continue functioning while the many events and procedures
linked to EVD were taking place. The importance of preparedness and
teamwork are among the key aspects described in this contribution.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upxyxopNKDc
David Henderson, of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Clinical Centre in
Bethesda, Maryland, delivered a critical analysis of how an EVD patient was treated
in the United States. According to his account, the management of human waste,
medical waste and even non-contaminated waste was a challenge, because key
people and institutions refused to accept them due to irrational fear.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9a26KVrWU38
Julie-Anne Dayer, of the University of Geneva Hospitals (HUG), described the
various complications facing the over 10,000 survivors of the EVD epidemic.
Her contribution is based on the limited published data on the subject, and
on direct observation at the MSF survivors’ clinic in Freetown. As well as
somatic and psychological complaints, a key problem is that the virus can
remain present in some body fluids several weeks after patients are
released from hospital with “virus-free” status.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=omImULFapeM
Claire-Anne Siegrist is at the Centre for Vaccinology and at the WHO Collaborating
centre for Vaccine Immunology of the University of Geneva Hospitals (HUG).
She describes the race for an Ebola vaccine that played out during the 2014–2015
period, reviewing current candidate vaccines and their trials. She concludes that
the vaccine pipeline which was empty at the beginning of 2014 is now full,
and that there now is an international obligation to deliver a functioning vaccine
before any future outbreaks occur.
Video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0BjCsrApth4
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